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Abstract
Through this longitudinal study of a historically significant, complex, conflicted and evolving macromarketing space, Bosnia’ s
Arizona Market, the authors reveal that marketing systems are not merely random artifacts of human behavior; rather, they are
adaptive, purposeful, can be pernicious and/or provisioning, and ultimately—if they are to reflect our humanity—must be well
integrated into other prosocial systems to affect the best possible outcomes for all stakeholders. By engaging with a marketing
system in a post-conflict, divided society, we are better able to understand the genesis and evolution of markets and marketing
systems; the relationships among war economy, peace accords, and the ways that post-war marketing systems create community, provide
for community needs, and create new vulnerabilities for some community members. The authors conclude with a discussion
of implications for sustainable peace and prosperity in Bosnia and in other post-conflict marketing systems, and suggestions for
future research.
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Introduction
Markets and marketing systems are now so ubiquitous, one wonders what would happen to us if they ceased to exist.
Con- sider a community disrupted by a dramatic structural break caused by political disintegration and violent conflict,
which destroyed its marketing system. Such an upheaval occurred in Bosnia, following independence and then war,
which lasted from April 6, 1992 to December 14, 1995. As news of the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA), quickly
spread to rural areas of Bosnia, an ad hoc market that would come to be called the Arizona Market emerged from a
field (Dayton Peace Agreement 1995).1
The Arizona Market would transform over time, from a gathering place for gossip and exchange of rudimentary goods,
to a regional market for illicit market activity, socializing, and exchange, to its current form as a commercial marketing
system legally integrated into other systems. The emergence and evolution of this marketing system happened, despite
the com- plex and often conflicting interests of players engaged in it, including combatants, former combatants, civilian
victims of war, and local and foreign governments. Furthermore, as the site of the Arizona Market grew, obstacles such
as landmines and other remnants of the war impeded safe exchange. As the market adapted over time, a new
community emerged, albeit one with a new governing structure that emphasized ethnic identity-differences. That
community continues to evolve, as do the systems – including its marketing system – in which it isintegrated.
In this longitudinal study, we explore the Arizona Market to examine the evolving relationships among marketing
systems, community, and the profound structural fractures caused by war, political revolution and societal disruption.
In so doing, we pose the following questions: how and why did this market emerge, and how did it create community,
or limit the creation of community? In the new marketing system, what was the role of exogenous forces, such as
1

peacekeeping initiatives, the DPA, and the wartime economy? Our intent is to shed some light on answers to the
preceding questions, while describing unique market and marketing phenomena – specifically, post- war, ad hoc
marketing systems – with implications for sustainable peace and prosperity in Bosnia and in other post-conflict
marketing systems.

Figure 1. Map of Southeast Europe and Specific Location of Brčko (Geo/Basis-DE/BKG 2009).

Conceptual Framework
Some prior macromarketing research has similarly analyzed marketing systems, including their emergence, or
recoveryfrom natural and human-induced disaster. Duffy and Layton (2013), for example, studied the arrival of a
touristic marketing system in the pristine Ningaloo Marine Park, Western Australia. Baker (2009) examined marketing
systems in rural Wyoming, after small towns were disrupted by natural disasters,specifically, tornadoes, the ad hoc and
commercial marketing exchange systems that emerged after natural disaster, and the ways that these marketing
exchange systems meet community needs. Shultz (1997, 2015) has explored marketing system complexities and forces
that both impede and enhance system-recovery and sustainable development following resource degradation,
poor/failed governance and war. Barrios et al. (2016) most recently have studied the importance of stakeholder
empowerment, communication, community building, and regulation to establish equitable and sustainable marketing
systems, as vital to cessation of civil war and assurances of sustainable peace.
In an especially relevant contribution regarding ad hoc markets, Baker et al. (2015) theorize such markets as public-private
alliances, often staffed and stocked by volunteers, government agencies, and non-profit agencies. They are neither solely
commercialnor solely social. Instead, they are representative of the theory thatmarketing activities create value through the
social discourse of exchange and community building; ad hoc markets provide solutions to unmet needs, as well as a sense
of fairness and well-being(see also Mittelstaedt, Kilbourne, and Mittelstaedt 2006).
Ad hoc markets include representatives from government, nonprofit organizations and volunteers, and community
organi- zations that “influence resource flows” (e.g., Baker et al. 2015, p. 337; see also Hunt 2010). Marketplace tension
arises when the ad hoc market’s community-building goals conflict with consumer expectations that the market will be
a place to satisfy individual needs that can be met in a commercial market exchange system, such as choices or
identity; in times of crisis,such as natural disasters, when commercial markets might be destroyed, ad hoc markets
temporarily replace the commercial marketing exchange (Baker et al. 2015). One can surmise that the size of the ad hoc
market, relative to the commercial market, will depend on the degree of devastation experienced by a com- munity
following a natural disaster; in cases in which the size of the ad hoc market exceeds that of the commercial market, the
former provides unmet needs, facilitates community relation- ships, and aids in the post-disaster evolution of the
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community (see also Barrios et al. 2016). Moreover, Baker et al. (2015) theorize that the ad hoc market expands
community, serves as an intermediary in community relationships, and performs the role of catalyst for communitybuilding in a liminal period.
Less well known or understood is how an ad hoc market would create value at the community level, in a post-conflict
society, fractured by political reorganization and war. Given recent work in devastated and recovering markets (e.g.,
Baker et al. 2015; Barrios et al. 2016), we might expect the ad hoc market to build community, to create a new community order, and to expand the community’s resource capacity. For example, Arizona, in its original form, was
logistically central to all the former combatants, which suggests that it could either be a site for re-igniting armed
conflict, or building community.
In November 1995, the Arizona Market emerged on the Ari- zona Road, the main conduit for North-South movement in
the region. The road was protected by NATO-led Stabilization Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (SFOR), with the
valorous or infamous, depending on one’s political orientation, US Armytank that is still part of local lore swirling about
the market. Yetthe road and the market site are outside the authority of the International Supervisor for Brčko, the
international authority created in the Dayton negotiations to administer Brčko district until 2000, when it was planned
to transition to local rule.
The location and security of Arizona suggest it was a convenient meeting point. However, Arizona’s central location
also meant it could be a site for armed contestation of Dayton’simplementation, by former combatants. Furthermore,
Arizona sat very close to landmine-laden fields, making it an unlikely meeting point. Nevertheless, that is what it
became. While there were few success stories in Brčko and adjacent territory (see Figure 1 for map), Arizona was one
of them, symbolizing hope for peace, as well as a point of contestation for local power. We explore how these factors
led to the value community-members – from locals to representatives of SFOR – found (and did not find) in Arizona.
Our work is informed by findings from prior research in conflict and post-conflict divided societies (e.g., Andreas
2004; Daly and Sarkin 2007; McGarry and O’Leary 1993; Nagle and Clancy 2010; Paris 2004; Sarkin 2008),
including, for example, various regions of the states that emerged from the end of the Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (SFRY, former Yugoslavia, Yugoslavia, 1943-1991) (e.g., Shultz et al. 2005; Silber and Little 1997),
Colombia (e.g., Bouvier 2009), Northern Ireland (e.g., Cox, Guelke, and Stephen 2006), and Lebanon (e.g., Salloukh et
al. 2015), to name but a few coun- tries that have recently experienced wars of secession (SFRY), protracted civil wars
(Colombia, Lebanon) or “troubles” (Northern Ireland), with various peace accords and marketing systems now in place,
albeit tenuously in some locations. Those works suggest that war usually does not end trade, it changes itsstructure and
often is nefarious (Andreas 2004; see also Barrios et al. 2016; Marshall 2012).
The War in Bosnia, and the period during and following reconstruction after the DPA was reached in November 1995,
suggest that reconstruction processes, including in Bosnia, have the potential to continue illegal market activity, as
well as to exacerbate social divisions (Andreas 2004). The same market, political, and military institutions that stoked
the war, such as smugglers, political party leaders, and military leaders, are often the peace negotiators on the part of
combatants (Andreas 2004, 2005). For example, Slobodan Milošević negotiated on behalf of Republika Srpska
(RS) and FRY (FRY, what was left of the old SFRY after January 1992) at Dayton. Thus, prior research implies that,
in the process of creating a lasting peace and re-constructing markets, the structural relationship among local
enterprise, both legal and illegal, the community, and local and global political interests should be taken into
consideration so as to avoid creating an infrastructure that supports divisions that initiated and sustained the war
(Ballentine and Nitzschke 2005; Goodhand 2004; Jeffrey 2006).
Another critique of the DPA in the related literature is the governing structure it created for Bosnia:
consociationalism, which refers to a form of power sharing at the state level on the basis of ethnicity and/or
religion, as opposed to a majority election system (e.g., Belloni 2004). Consociationalism is a governing process of
cooperation among the (elected) leaders of each ethnic/religious group. In the process of reconciling social divisions, it
also may affirm post- conflict social divisions. Socio-cultural markers of ethnicity, such as religion, language, or dress,
during the period of the SFRY, were often understood in official politics as symbols of shared Yugoslav culture.
Official political-cultural rhetoric during and after the war re-interpreted these markers as symbols of ethnic identity
difference and the need for separate nation-states (Bringa 1995; Ignatieff 1993; Nagle and Clancy 2010; Sarkin 2008).
3

At war’s end, the political parties, which were defined by ethnicity and ethnic difference, tended to focus on
maintaining division over reconciliation as a means of maintaining power. Although the conflict literature on the
DPA and Brčko has studied Arizona’s emergence and privatization to demonstrate the limitations of peace
settlements based on cartographic solutions, as was the case in Bosnia, and consociational governance, a marketing
systems analysis and interpretation of Arizona as an ad hoc market system and its evolution into a commercial market
system is needed to further understand how the community found (or did not find) value in the DPA, givenits
limitations.
The aforementioned marketing systems research suggests that Arizona, as an ad hoc market that emerged after a catastrophic event, would have a relationship with the former or current commercial market exchange system, such that
when the latter is destroyed by war, the former takes over the role of provisioning, meeting needs, exchange, and the
organized flowof goods. Yet, during the war, the region around Arizona was a wartime marketing system, supplied by
smuggled goods that were often looted in war or stolen from international aid organizations. Given a symbiotic
relationship between ad hoc and commercial markets, such that ad hoc markets seem to expand to take over the
provisioning roles of the commercial market once it is destroyed, could we expect that the ad hoc market would take
over the war economy? And if the ad hoc market resembles the wartime market, does the ad hoc market have a chance
to build community, as we might predict? Our research explores these questions.
In sum, for at least five decades – from Alderson (1965), Fisk (1967), Slater (1968), and Bartels and Jenkins (1977) to
Peterson (2013), Baker et al. (2015), Layton (2015) and Barrioset al. (2016) – marketing-systems research occurs or has
occurred largely at sites where established social, political, ecological, economic systems exist in various forms to
deliver goods and services to consumers and communities; the over- arching objective is to understand, to change
and/or “to improve” the system through “best practices”. Our approach to researching marketing systems and
community in post- conflict sites – especially places where states have disinte- grated or failed, and marketing
systems have been affectedby a dramatic structural break – builds on this and other work by examining the Arizona
Market.
Methods
The design of this longitudinal study drew upon historical analysis and systems-oriented research methods often
favored by Macromarketers. The multinational research team possesses rich, varied and nuanced experience with and
understandingof the region and its people. The project, now in its sixteenth year at the time of this writing, is intended
to enhance under- standing vis-à-vis the genesis and evolution of Arizona Market, including its precise location, its
physical parameters and meta- morphosis, and various forces that affect(ed) the emergence, development and
sustainability of the marketing system (e.g., Fisk 1967; Layton 2007, 2009, 2015; Shultz et al. 2012; Shultz and
Pecotich 1997; Slater 1968). Moreover, the authors are keen to understand the intensive marketing dynamic(s) (Shultz,
Pecotich, and Le 1994; see also Holtzman 1986) of Arizona, with attention to the flow of goods and services in and
through the market; the types of retailers and consumers attracted, and the reciprocal social/political/economic forces
that affectedand were affected by marketing and consumption in Arizona (see also Shultz et al. 2005). The principal
foci explored were/are the marketing, consumption behaviors and policy activities in the market, in the surrounding
community, in the larger Brčko District, and in the region and across borders to include Croatia, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Serbia, and even Hungary, Germany, Austria, Turkey and China whose products, services,people and
marketing models were/are part-and-parcel evident in the Arizona Market.
The specific techniques included site observation (e.g., Lincoln and Guba 1985), interviews (e.g., McCracken 1988);
photographic, video and audio recording of the site, excluding informants (e.g., Holbrook and Kuwahara 1998;
Kozinets and Belk 2006) and historical analysis and reflection (e.g., Scott, Chambers, and Sredl 2006). Members of the
research team have used these techniques to collect data throughout the region since 1993, during and following the
various wars of Yugoslav succession/secession.
While conducting interviews and participant-observation, we follow the suggestions of Lee (1994) for protecting
potentially vulnerable informants and for conducting dangerous fieldwork. The work of Lee-Treweek and Linkogle
(2000, p. 7) on maintaining the safety of researchers and the safety of informants through painstaking efforts to ensure
the anonymityof informants influenced our data collection and our write-up of this ethnography. Informants were
accessed through the snowball method, starting with friends and acquaintances ofa co-author, who is from Bosnia
and Herzegovina. We sought informants who represented a variety of perspectives on the war: civilian and military,
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Serb, Croat, and Bosnian, politician,merchants, consumers at Arizona, refugees who had returned, and those who lived
in houses that they occupied during the war. After describing to informants the goals of our research, assuring them
complete and untraceable anonymity, and dis- cussing the intended audience for our work, we asked for and received
verbal informed consent. We decided not to pursue audio and video recording of interviews. From a local perspective,
there is a potential for the comments of informants to be used against them; should armed conflict again erupt in the
area, the potential for personal harm is considerable. One mightsee the legacy of not only the war, but also of the SFRY
secret police (UDBA) and the use of state power to advance personal goals, in the reluctance of informants to have their
exact wordsdocumented, either through audio or video recording. In this research, we rely on field notes.2
Given the political discord and military violence that led to the emergence of the market and the ways in which it
currently is administered–and which still simmers, thus affecting ongoing marketing system dynamics–considerable
effort was made to access people and institutions that often have conflicting recollections of events, and have different
perspectives on current activities in Arizona and the marketing system’s future.Through triangulation, and persistent
engagement and observation, we were able to discern some emergent themes deemed indicative of the realities that
fomented the destruction of an extant marketing system and the emergence of a new market and broader marketing
system, in the forms of Arizona Market, Brčko and Bosnia and Herzegovina (see also Wallendorf and Belk 1989).
Following the ethical norms of research that asks investigators to do no harm, when informants discussed illegal
activities at Arizona, we did not ask informants to discuss their potential involvement in such trade. We use secondary
sourcesas data in our discussion of illegal activities. In summary, we immersed ourselves in the Arizona market and its
internal and external communities, over time. We add that the ethnic com- position, cultural sensitivities, and language
proficiencies of some members of the research team matched those of the informants, which facilitated an empathic
approach, reduced power distance, and increased trustworthiness. Trustworthiness is especially valuable at sites where
ethnic and/or political tensions remain a concern.
Findings, Interpretations and Emergent Themes
In the findings, we explore the ways that Arizona emerged in late November 1995 to repair the social ties of
community that the war destroyed, as well as to create new identity boundaries as Arizona transitioned in 2000 from an
ad hoc to a commercialmarketing system. Likewise, we address the ways that Arizona served to replicate the inflow of
goods from the wartime marketing system, thereby replicating new divisions and creating a new flow of provisions and
space for exchange, thus creating community. In our discussion of Arizona’s evolution, we draw attention to unique
barriers to building community at this site, such as demining and jurisdictional authority, that influenced the ways that
community is expressed and is limited. We begin this section with a description of the war marketing system in Bosnia,
as it set the stage for the system that Arizona both would replace and replicate.
War as a Marketing System
Croatia and Slovenia declared independence on 25 June 1991, and were recognized by the European Economic
Community on 15 January 1992. On 26 June 1991, the Yugoslav National Army (JNA), invaded Slovenia; the war
lasted 10 days. In the fall of 1991, the war in Croatia began. The United Nations Security Council passed Resolution
713 on 25 September 1991, creating an arms embargo on the successor states of the SFRY. A referendum for
independence passed in Bosnia on 29 February 1992; the War in Bosnia began in April 1992. On 30 May 1992, the US
and the UN enforced a trade embargo on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
Although the goal of the arms embargo was to prevent further conflict, the outcome of the arms embargo was that it
arguably created the conditions for a wartime marketing system. Andreas (2004), in analyzing the clandestine markets
in Bosnia created by the blockade, and the relationship between these markets and peace, describes the control of the
inflow of armaments and fuel (usually smuggled), food aid from
international organizations, and similar supplies necessary to sustain combat and civilian life, as economic blockades.
These blockades, often implicitly supported by the states creating embargos, were sustained by local elites as a means of
solidify- ing their power and increasing their wealth through controllingwhat was essentially a combat market (Andreas
2004). For example, arms smuggling into Croatia and Bosnia, from the United States or other countries, was largely
overlooked by officials of the United States Department of State, and allegedly conducted by, for example, some
military and political leaders in Croatia or Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as para- military leaders (Cohen 1994;
Pomfret and Ottaway 1996; Schmetzer 1995). The source of armaments was often the sudden surplus of arms on the
informal arms market after the break-up of the Soviet Union, including such symbols of the Cold War as the
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Kalashnikov rifle (Arsovska and Kostakos 2008; Hajdinjak 2002).
In addition to the combat market, a further characteristic of a war marketing system, or what Barrios et al. (2016)
have called a war economy, is what Goodhand (2004) has termed a shadow market. The shadow market functions to
distribute the goods that the elites have allowed to pass through the economic blockade and into the war marketing
system. These goods can supply militaries or be traded or bought by the majority of the civilian population,
accordingto Goodhand (2004). In sum, the war economy functions in ways that maintain conflict and empower some
groups over others (Goodhand 2004).
A synthesis of field notes from interviews with informants who fought in the war reveals the logistical operationof
the three-tier wartime marketing system. The armies lacked supplies. The ARBiH and the HVO had to furnish
cigarettes, food, alcohol and other supplies to their armies throughout the areas they controlled: the southern part of
Brčko and BH. They also had to supply their soldiers fight- ing in Serbian (JNA, RS) territory in the north.3 To
supply the armies, the leaders of these militaries sought passage through and trade deals with the leaders of the JNA
and the VRS, at great profit to those elites functioning at the combat and shadow levels. The combat-trade dynamic
was often surreal: at dawn, soldiers from opposing sides shot at each other across the front line. In the afternoon, they
traded goods needed for sustenance, such as coffee, flour, and cigarettes. Trade was made much easier since most of
the soldiers knew their trade partners; in many cases they hadbeen neighbors. Through trade, military and political
struc- tures, and actors within the structure, were linked through the war economy, at various levels of supply,
distribution, exchange, and consumption.
Dayton, Brcˇko and the Transition to Peace
The response of the international community to end the war in Bosnia (1992-1995) was to search for a “cartographic
solution” (Jeffrey 2006, p. 209). From the attempts at peace starting withthe Lisbon Conference (February 1992), to the
Vance Owen Plan (January 1993) and the Dayton Peace Agreement (November 1995), the international community
sought peace via a divisionof territory that all sides could accept (Jeffrey 2006). The carto- graphic solution had the effect
of endorsing a divided society and the ethnic concept of statehood, nationhood, identity, territory, and citizenship.
Because it put new political parties in power, based on these new divisions, the DPA also ended up emphasiz- ing the
social division created by war.
The Bosnia and Herzegovina state (BiH) created at Dayton is composed of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
(FBiH) and Republika Srpska (RS). FBiH consists of 10 autonomous majority-Bosnian or majority-Croat cantons with
their own governments. Brčko District was created as a special unit of self-government in Bosnia, and as a buffer zone
between RS and FBiH. Within Brčko District, borders were drawn, based on ethnicity.
The Inter-Ethnic Boundary Line (IEBL) within the District divided it into two zones. Brčko city was north of the line,
and populated by Serbs. South of the IEBL were the Croat and Bosnian sections. The two-kilometers-wide Zone of
Separation(ZOS) on either side of the IEBL served as a transition and dis- armament point between zones controlled by
IFOR. Per Dayton, Brčko would be governed by the International Supervisor for Brčko; the supervisor would be
independent from peacekeeping forces. In effect, IFOR (peacekeeping forces) had more power inthe IEBL than did the
International Supervisor for Brčko.
In Brčko, IFOR was composed of Multi-National Division (North), led by American forces, specifically, the US
Army’s 1st Brigade of the 1st Armored Division, under the command of Major General William L. Nash. The main
points of US military responsibilities as peacekeeping forces were made explicit and included: compliance with the
terms of the annex (Brčko), withdrawal of forces and establishment of zones of separation; monitor clearing of
minefields, liaise with civilian and military authorities, assist with movement of humanitarian missions by UNHCR
and other organizations, observe and prevent interference with the movement of civilians, refugees, and displaced
persons, and respond to deliberate violence (Farrand 2011).
Noteworthy is the sparse consideration of the process of market reconstruction in the establishment of the International
Supervisor for Brčko and IFOR, much less in the Dayton Agreement, relative to the attention given to the role of
NATO-led IFOR in implementing the military aspects of the agreement (Scott and Murphy 2005). For example, the
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terms regarding the economy and markets refer only to the governmentof Bosnia and its responsibility to protect private
property and itsdesire for a market economy. Likewise, the DPA states that the government will promote trade and
economic development via establishment of and cooperation with other Chambers of Commerce, yet makes no
suggestion who would be responsible, and how that responsibility would be divided among the ethnic groups (Dayton
Peace Agreement, 1995, 141, Annex 4 p. 59). The implicit assumption of DPA is that market growth and economic
development would emerge as a by-product or intandem with peace.

In sum, the DPA and the creation of Brčko District institutionalized ethnic/religious differences and created a
consociational government, in which decisions are made by leaders of each ethnic group, and the International
Supervisor. The main framing of peacekeeping was how to implement the new structures of ethnic difference that were
set in consociational governance and how to enact property restitution. Attention to continuation of the peaceful social
norms of the shared society of the past tended to be overlooked. In addition, the framing of economic development as
investment and trade, rather than building quality-of-life (cf. Shultz 2015), was instrumental to the birth of Arizona as
ad hoc and community-level (Baker et al. 2015). However, as we shall see in the next section, the leaders of the
peacekeeping effort quickly saw that ensuring peace meant creating safety for locals as they sought to return to the
social norms of a shared society, including meeting to trade goods and information.
Community at Arizona. One of the first tasks of IFOR was tore-build roads and bridges, to allow for the safe movement
of refugees and internally displaced persons. IFOR started the process by building “Route Texas,” running East-West
along the Sava, and then “Route Arizona” running North-South fromCroatia, across the Sava at the border with BH,
through RS, andinto Brčko at the International Boundary between BH, RS, and Brčko. Route Arizona also crossed the
Zone of Separation; it continued from Brčko Entity South to Tuzla and then to Sar- ajevo. The safe functioning of
Routes Texas and Arizona allowed for the peaceful and secure movement of civilians, most of whom were displaced
from their homes. The secure routes were also necessary so that the aid community could access the area; IFOR used
tanks and armored vehicles to patrolthese routes (See Figures 2 and 3). IFOR, mostly represented in this area by the
US Army’s1st Armored Division (1st AD), started a checkpoint at the spot that Route Arizona met the ZOS. This
point was also close to the borders of RS, BH, and Brčko. Civilians, travelling North-South into and out of
Brčko, passed through the checkpoint; they could also relinquish their weapons atthe checkpoint.
Word quickly spread among locals that an American tank was stationed at, and armed American soldiers were working
at, the checkpoint. Croatians, Bosnians, and people from mixed backgrounds, began traveling to the location of the tank
in the ZOS, to meet. Local civilians came for the purpose of sharing information and selling produce on the road at and
around the checkpoint. Exchange was typically transacted with the facilityof German Marks (DM). Merchandise was
displayed on bed sheets, laid on the ground by sellers. This pattern somewhat replicated ways civilians traditionally
sold produce from their domestic gardens, along the road, before the war.
Based on what we saw on the road during our site visits, locals continue to sell their produce on the side of the road.
Thispractice was a return to “normal” trade; customarily, the primary purpose was to make profit. Produce was
collected from domestic gardens and offered from the trunk of a car, or a table set-up in front of a car. Prices were
marked by hand on a sign

Figure 2. Map of Brčko circa January 1996, showing Arizona Road and Arizona market site (Scott and Murphy 2005, p. 24).
7

Figure 3. Photo of Arizona sign, circa 1995-2001, including the word Tržnica (Market).
made of cardboard and posted beside the car, as they still are (but now in KM, the local currency). A typical sign we
saw, printed in the Latin-alphabet Croatian, was: “cabbage, 8DM/ kg”, or “domestic vegetables.” The nature of
demand can be understood as a desire for the return to normal, meaning pre- war, ways of socializing and exchange,
specifically of produce,as well as a desire for produce, which in winter, when the DPA was signed, would largely have
been potatoes and cabbage.
- that
The volume of cars, produce, and people gathering in other words, the material symbols of a market grew to a size
blocked the busy Route Arizona. The 1st AD, with the goal of keeping the road safe for movement and free of
obstruction, encouraged local Croatian, Bosnian, and Serbian de-mining operations to clear a field on the side of the
road. Then, the 1st AD brought in gravel to cover that field, with the intention that meetings could take place in and
cars could be parked on the gravel-covered field—instead of the road, or in other areas,which still contained
unexploded ordnance (see also Scott and Murphy 2005). The roadside meetings and small-time selling of produce
moved immediately to the field, and more and more people came to meet and to trade at this safe place.

From the start, Arizona was a place that allowed locals to re- open communication, and to ask each other questions such
as, “who set us against each other?” The people who started meet- ing at Arizona–Serbs, Bosnians and Croats–were
people from inter-ethnic families or who were friends before the war. They wanted to ask about their old friends and
their welfare, or if war had changed them: had they become extremely nationalistic? Were former friends and neighbors
now showing a new identityor extreme nationalism through their dress or behavior, such asno longer speaking with
friends of the other ethnicity, or wear- ing a long beard? A typical question would have been: is it safe for me to return to
that area, or is it not hostile to people of my ethnicity? People also came there to exchange information about missing
and dead family members, the whereabouts and welfare of refugees, and houses left behind. Civilians, and not officials,
knew this information because civilians stayed in their homes during the war. It was difficult to believe that Dayton
would guarantee peace in that area, and most people were afraid it would fail. Yet the 1st AD tanks seemed to
represent a new period.
Officers from all three warring sides, and from the 1st AD, began to socialize at Mandicina Kafana, a cafe´ in Arizona.
They came for scheduled meetings with US Generals and sat informally; their socializing contributed to the chances
that a structure of peace would emerge, even in a context in which the two sides were still concerned that the other
would attack on the battlefield, as tanks and guns remained around the periphery of Arizona. Since local leadership was
organized accordingto ethnicity, and the military and political leadership and the leaders of the smuggling enterprises
tended to share political and financial interests, these meetings tended to re-establish the political groups that created and
sustained the war. Another consequence of US Army activity at Arizona, such as clearing landmines and safeguarding
Arizona, also allowed under- served locals to participate in the re-construction of the mar- keting system and to
experience a return to a sense of normalcyin the shared social relations of everyday life, similar to what Baker et al.
(2015) theorized ad hoc markets allow to happen after events that are traumatic to communities. Market-building and
community building activities at Arizona were ad hoc in that they were not within the mandate of IFOR, as outlined by
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Dayton. Yet they created a shared space where old social relations could be re-articulated, in a new political reality,
shaped by focusing on political and ethnic identity differences. The political dimension of community building at
Arizona addsto the idea of ad hoc marketing systems as building community, again as presented in Baker et al. (2015)
and Shultz et al. (2005).
Provisioning, Exchange and Assortment at Arizona
The goods in demand, supplied, and exchanged at Arizona reflected the destruction of war and a need to create a new
market. During the war, homes were destroyed. People had no meat to eat, a staple in Brčko. They had received
humanitarian aid for a long period and were eager to have more to eat, as
well as an assortment of foods. After the war, there was an influx of cash. First, the international community provided
humanitarian assistance in Brčko and other reconstructed areas for re-building homes as a means of facilitating
refugee return. Second, cash came in the form of remittances from the large number of Bosnians who were refugees in
or had moved during the Yugoslav era to, for example, Canada, Germany, Austria, America, and Australia, and sent
money home. Over- all, there was a desire to rebuild houses that were purposely destroyed, and there were two steady
sources of money with which to do it.
Some of the remittances and re-building money were used tostart businesses, rather than to sell/build houses. War, and
privatization, changed the way people in the region thought about money. Before the war, people in Yugoslavia could
keep only a small amount of cash in the bank; the limitation on accumulating capital normalized grey-economy
exchange and construction. The grey-economy practices of the pre-war era only increased during privatization and the
relative lack of regulation in the early 1990s. A person in Brčko, for example, could start with 1,000 DM, travel to
Turkey to buy t-shirts or jeans, and return to Arizona and sell it all for a considerable profit. Through remittances, and
through aid foundations that donated money for reconstruction, cash flowed into Arizona; that cash likely supported
much of the trade.
Arizona also offered a solution to the dearth of economic activity in the region. The territory that would become RS
remained agriculturally productive after the war, though sub- optimally because of territorial and property disputes,
and unmarked landmines. Northeast Bosnia had industry in the Yugoslavia era, including, for example, Izboro leather
shoe factory, BiMex meat canning factory, and Bimal food oil processing factory, yet these factories were no longer
operational, due to lack of investment in the 1980s and war-damage (Far- rand 2011). Bosnians, however, did receive
cash remittances from family members living abroad, the intervention of the international community, and the
increased grey-economy trade.
The Croatian pharmaceutical industry remained intact after the war, which proved helpful to Bosnians when Croats
ventured to Arizona to sell diapers, detergents, and medicine. RS was isolated from the international community by a
trade embargo, and it had no trade relations with either Croatia or BH. Yet agricultural products in RS were priced
very low, andthere was a surplus, so Serbs from RS traveled to Arizona to sell or trade their produce, which was a
solution for the market isolation experienced in RS. The market, therefore, was a place for building community through
exchange and provisioning.
A marketing system, and a community, was taking shape: provisions were being marketed to meet demand, assortment
increased, and the system was adapting, although not without concerns. Among them: quality, reliability and dubious
originsof supply, such as from actors involved in supply or distribution in the war economy; poor-to-no regulations or
standards beyond momentary and mutual agreement among buyers and sellers; infrastructure, storage capacity and
security of inventory; hygiene; trends involving prostitution, human trafficking, and other illegal and “dark side”
selling/consumption practices (see also Farrand 2011; Kennedy 2005).
By the end of 1996, the Arizona Market covered an area of approximately 15 acres, with about 2,000 sellers. Land
ownerscharged high fees to rent space to sellers, who began to build stalls. Locals came and charged for using the
toilet—there were just five wooden toilets—and for parking. Prices were not regulated, and taxes were not paid on sales
or profits. Sanitationwas not regulated. “Night clubs” and casinos opened. It is widely known in the region that, after
the war, at Arizona, drug smuggling, human trafficking, and prostitution were rife (Farrand 2011; Kennedy 2005).
Although they were not asked (so as to avoid the risk of doing harm) and did not volunteer information or evidence of
direct involvement in drug smuggling, human trafficking, and prostitution, our informants frequently mentioned that
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these activities took place at Arizona in the post-war era. Moreover, we are able to triangulate stories of illegal
activities, especiallyhuman trafficking, through news reports of UN police- involvement in the enslavement of Eastern
European women in brothels in Bosnia and the cover-up of UN involvement in illegal activity (Lynch 2001, see also
Haynes 2010). Through- out the remainder of the 1990s, the International Supervisor for Brčko, Robert Farrand, wanted
to close Arizona because of the illegal activities (Kennedy 2005). The local command of the US Army, however, was
an advocate for Arizona—albeit with better regulation—as an obvious catalyst for building peace through building
community and political ties, through trade of less nefarious goods and services, and socializing over coffee at
Arizona.
In addition to the human rights violations and drug smuggling that were part of the supply and demand dynamics of
Arizona, the sale of Smederevac brand ovens at Arizona helps to illuminate this paradox of building community while
unofficially endorsing illegal and unethical behavior. This case suggests that smuggling at Arizona was linked to the
war economyas well. In fact, the distribution of Smederevac at Arizona demonstrates that Arizona may have
perpetuated the new divisions that emerged during the war, as the shadow economy of distributing looted goods
supplied consumers who purchased them at Arizona.
The purchase of the Smederevac oven factory by a person from Brčko, similarly to most privatization transactions during
war in the successor states, was described as heavily influenced by political favoritism and bribes. Furthermore, we were
informed the buyer made a fortune in the privatization transaction and in the sale of smuggled Smederevac ovens at
Arizona to displaced per- sons re-building their homes. Many other large and successful stores and factories from the
SFRY-era were closed or destroyed during the war, the goods were stolen, and sold at Arizona to people rebuilding
homes destroyed during the war. At night, dealers would meet to exchange large inventories of goods that were looted
during the war, confiscated, or otherwise stolen.
The copper trade at Arizona provides another illustrative example of the ways that Arizona supported the
legitimization of illicit enterprise, linked to the war, in the post-conflict era. Yet Arizona also supplied community
needs for goods, as would a government sanctioned ad hoc market. Our informants told us that much of the copper
piping that was sold at Arizona originated in war-time plundering of homes throughout the region. These pipes were
plundered by military, then sold in the shadow economy, then re-distributed and sold at Arizona. Most of the buyers
were probably returnees who were rebuilding their homes, perhaps buying at Arizona the same plumbing that was
stolen from their house. Much of the funds to re-build homes came to the consumers living at the coping level from
reconstruction donor countries and diaspora remittances. By not regulating who traded at the market, or the traffic
entering Arizona, the US Army was complicit in continuing the dynamics and divisions of the war economy. The
divisions continued across combatant or political lines as supplying Ari- zona tended to be aligned with the goods
accessible across borders (Croatia and pharmaceuticals, Serbia and Smederevac brand ovens).
Divisions also continued between those who supplied Ari- zona, and therefore continued to make a profit from
wartime activities or access to smuggled goods, and those who bought goods at Arizona. While Arizona provided for
community needs, consumers were made vulnerable by the war and its aftermath, as they had to rebuild, and their
choice for sourcing of goods was largely limited to what Arizona offered, and the terms negotiated there.
Why a Market, Here?
A begging question for the research team as we dug more deeply into the project: Why did a market emerge in the
precise location of Arizona? We repeatedly heard from informants, when asked if the market could have materialized
anywhere else in the Posavina Corridor, that while the presence of the tank and soldiers at the checkpoint indeed was
important, given the international politics of the war, the most important reason that people came was that the tanks and
soldiers were American. These armaments, under the authority of a US government that many local Bosnians and
Croats perceivedto be pro-Bosnia during the war, instilled a belief among informants that the space, which eventually
would become Arizona Market, was now safe and would remain safe, even if hostilities resumed elsewhere.
The failures of the European Community and the UN Peace- keepers to stop the war and to stop the atrocities committed
during the war created skepticism about Dayton, among locals. For example, the UN Peacekeepers in Bosnia, who did
not intervene to stop the massacre at Srebrenica, were Dutch soldiers. Similarly, French military officials visited
Sarajevo dur- ing the Siege of Sarajevo, yet neither France nor the UN intervened in ways that would have stopped the
human suffer- ing of the Siege. The US government cooperated with the smuggling that armed the ARBiH (tacit
cooperation via over- looking), and the US led NATO airstrikes on ARS positions in Bosnia between 30 August and 30
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September 1995, which are generally understood to have facilitated the end of the wars. American troops and
American tanks were the material representation of moral and political will to act on behalf of Bosniancitizens. A Lt.
Colonel in the US Army, and a member of the unit that participated in the building of Arizona, Tony Cucolo, described
the dynamic:
Near one of the task force’s checkpoints, the US brigade carved out and cleared a piece of land for roadside merchants
that became known as the Arizona Market. Overnight, it acquired a reputation as the best four acres in the American
sector for changing perceptions. There, Bosniacs, Croats, and Serbs mingled, shopped, bought and sold sugar, plum
brandy, music, and livestock, and interacted with each other as though there had never been a war. It became a
magnet for what can perhaps best be described as cross-boundary tailgate parties, and was a superb environment to
begin rebuilding relationships and trust (Cucolo 1999, p. 12).
It should be noted that three stories in the region have emergedregarding the origin of the name “Arizona” for the
market space. They are all true, in the sense that each story suggests the experience of meeting or trading at Arizona
Marketplace. The first origin-story is that the name comes from the road, Route Arizona. Another story is from popular
imagination among locals about Arizona representing the Wild West of the USA; a place where anything or anyone
could be bought and sold if you could get your hands on it and if the price was right.The third origin narrative is from
Emir Kusturica, who directedthe film, Arizona Dream, in 1993. In this origin-narrative, Ari- zona is a fantasy place of
sorts, where all things are possible, where dreams can come true.
Arizona, we suggest, was as a space in which locals could find common ground for re-articulating cultural
similarities across ethnic lines through trade rituals, after a period of violence and political discourse that
emphasized differences and precluded trade (Nagle and Clancy 2010, p. 93). At the level of macro-analysis, the
American tank can be understood as emphasizing that the space of Arizona belonged to none of the ethno-political
groups. By implication of no group controlling Arizona, it became a common ground, a space for building community
through trade, specifically through the social interaction of trade (cf. Nagle and Clancy 2010, re Northern Ireland;
Daly and Sarkin 2007; Sarkin 2008).

Institutionalizing Arizona
To some, such as IFOR, Arizona was a symbol of peace and community building based on the political system of
consocia tionalism and shared society. For other political institutions, such as the International Supervisor for Brčko,
Arizona was a symbol of post-war profiteering and a continuation of the war economy. In fact, it was both.
While the efforts of the US Army in Brčko, and in Arizona specifically, played a role in building peace via renewed
communication, socialization and marketing activities, some members of the international community, especially
the Inter- national Supervisor for Brčko, who concurrently served as the Deputy High Representative for the northern
sector of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ambassador Robert Farrand, viewed Ari- zona as a site of human rights violations
and smuggling that destroyed community (Farrand 2011). These latter two activities raised questions about whether the
efforts toward peace- building and democracy were successful, or at least not withoutserious social costs. Furthermore,
any peacebuilding that occurred at Arizona could not be categorized as a successful outcome resulting from the
international community’s activities because Arizona was in the ZOS, making it outside the geographic sphere of
authority held by the International Super- visor for Brčko.
As the decision of the International Supervisor for Brčko regarding the future governance of Brčko reached its
deadline in 2000, attention turned to finding a success story. Serbs were upset by the political decision to remove the
IEBL and create Brčko Canton in 1997. There were very few examples of implementation of free-and-fair elections,
along with just a few examples of the safe return of refugees and other displaced persons to their occupied homes. No
group was collecting taxes on trade in Arizona. Mayors of ethnically organized villages wanted control of Arizona, and
often asked the Supervisor to demolish it or to give it to their jurisdiction. While Arizona represented a potential source
of re-emerging conflict, it also offered a rare opportunity to present a success in Brčko, as Arizona symbolized a
return to more peaceful inter-ethnic social relations. Yet its “Wild West” status was not acceptable as part of the
success story. The Supervisor wanted the current site demolished and a new Arizona opened within Brčko, and under
control of the Supervisor, as opposed to the political limbo of the ZOS and IFOR.
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A tender for demolishing extant Arizona and construction of a new Arizona was issued. ItalProject, an Italian-Bosnian
com- pany, was the winner, with a tender that included plans for parking, power, water, sanitation, and space for police
presence. In 2004, Arizona reopened as an “out-of-town mall and tourist attraction” (Jeffrey 2006, p. 216). It remains
state- owned, yet managed by ItalProject. The new Arizona consists of two halls, one on the West and one on the East
side of a four- lane, paved road that has ruts in all of its lanes. There is a grassymedian in-between the roads, as well as a
traffic circle – anchored by signage with “Arizona” and “ARIZONA Market”
– that directs cars to either of the halls, as seen in Figures 4 and 5.
Arizona, Today
Arizona, at the time of the researchers’ last visit, June 28, 2013, is markedly more institutionalized in its organization,
infra- structure, and cleanliness. Ramshackle huts, make-shift woo- den stalls, and muddy fields have largely
disappeared. Paved roads, brick-and-mortar or corrugated-metal buildings, and indeed a generally clear, predictable,
market-space with regulated merchants possessing a wide assortment of goods and

Figure 4. Signage for Today’s “Arizona”.

Figure 5. Signage for Today’s “Arizona”.
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Figure 6. Scale and Scope of Today’s Arizona (ATVBL 2014).

Figure 7. Typical Retail Spaces in Today’s Arizona Market.
services have risen, as seen in the aerial photo in Figure 6, which demonstrates the scope and scale of today’s Arizona.
Today’s Arizona is, for the most part, a contrast to the dynamic we found in the immediate post-Dayton era. Goods
sold include hardware, underwear, purses, carpets, rugs, blankets, curtains, housewares, sports clothes and trainers,
cosmetics, women’s clothes, men’s clothes, children’s clothes, shoes, electronics, toys, jewelry, toilets, sinks, paint,
tiles, rope,washing machines, patio bricks, car tires and car-related goods,CDs and movies, and cafés and restaurants
serving grilled food and an assortment of traditional snacks as well as ubiquitous food and other brands–or counterfeit
brands–one would find injust about any market. As in the regional cities, small stores typically sell one category of
goods: hardware stores sell only hardware, clothing stores clothing, and so forth. Images of some of these retail spaces
are found in Figures 6–10.
Some of the clothes in the stores were identical to items the authors have seen in small shops in Zagreb, Sarajevo,
Skopje, Ljubljana, Podgorica, Belgrade, Tirana, Thessaloniki, Bucharest, and indeed throughout the former
Yugoslavia and the Balkans more generally. The presence of similar goods in Arizona as in the small shops of regional
cities suggests to us that there are probably strong connections between Arizona and commerce throughout the region.
The language of religious symbols in the stores offered potential interpretations of Arizona as a site of continued
political maneuvering and the transformation of the shared space of the old Arizona into a divided space, a divided
society, and a political dynamic of between-group antagonism and within- group solidarity.
In many stores throughout Arizona, either a crucifix (RomanCatholic, associated with Croats and Croatia) or a nazar
(amu- let to ward off the “evil eye” that is often associated with Bosnia, rather than Croatia or Serbia) were displayed
inside the shop, by the door. The objects, as we understood their meaning, communicate the ethnic identity and
political allegiance of the shop and the people affiliated with it, which are Croatian and Bosnian, respectively. There
were more stores marked-out for identification for those with insider knowledge by displaying a nazar than stores
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marked by a crucifix by the door. The semiotics of religion and politics in Arizona’s stores,as symbolized in the nazar
and the Roman Catholic cross,

Figure 8. Typical Retail Spaces in Today’s Arizona Market.

Figure 9. Typical Retail Spaces in Today’s Arizona Market.

Figure 10. Typical Retail Spaces in Today’s Arizona Market.
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suggested to us a larger presence of Bosnian-managed stores at Arizona, than Croat or Serb-managed stores. Extending
that line of thought, we understood that more stores at Arizona had links to local Bosnian political parties than Croat or
Serb, in the continued consociational political organization of Bosnia.
Looking at the spatial distribution of these religious/ethnic/ identity/political symbols in the West side of Arizona,
stores with the same symbols tended to be in the same areas. That is, Bosnian stores, or stores with the nazar on display,
tended to be found together, while stores with the crucifix tended to be located in the same area. While the diversity of
symbols at Arizona suggest that it is a shared space, the clustering of symbols, suggest that Arizona is also a symbol of
the institutionalization of ethnic identity in politics and markets.
The retail spaces on the West side of Arizona also offered usnew cultural symbols of identity in the marketplace, in the
formof Chinese Shops.4 That is, in local terms, shops owned and operated by ethnic Chinese, the number and scale of
which have not been seen by any of the authors in any other part of the former Yugoslavia. Notable in the Chinese
shops, as com- pared to other shops, is the absence of the nazar and the crucifix. However, we did see traditional
Chinese cultural and/or religious amulets and artifacts, discreetly placed in retail spacesor in back rooms of Chinese
shops. We glimpsed into these “back stages” from the shop floor and saw cooking equipmentand food for preparation,
along with the amulets and artifacts in the back of the store.
The Chinese shops we encountered on the West side were unique in that we never saw a consumer in a store, browsing
or purchasing, or even speaking to an employee or owner. Chinese shops were filled with merchandise that we describe as
trinkets,plastic goods, t-shirts, and toys wrapped in clear, plastic packaging marked “Made in China.” These stores
seemed to be managed by the Chinese people who were sitting at the cash registers, while rudimentary stocking and
retailing tasks were administered by local employees. The East side of the road contained only vacant stores and shops
that fit the description, in their offering, staffing, and identity symbols, as Chinese managed (and perhaps owned)
shops, as seen in Figure 11.
In stores that we perceived to be owned by Bosnians or Croats, the staff, either on the retail floor or behind the cash
register, interacted with us; for example, they said hello or asked if we were looking for something special. At Chinese
shops, the staff did not engage us through a greeting or an inquiry. If we witnessed no buying or selling, and there
wasno interaction with potential customers, then how were they surviving? What did Croats, Bosnians, or Serbs
understand to be their reason for working at Arizona? Most importantly for our research: what can the presence of
Chinese shops at Ari- zona teach us about Arizona as a marketing system?
According to our informants, many local Bosnians find employment at Chinese shops. Bosnians apparently do not like
working in these stores, yet they may not have access to other employment. Locals suggested that Milošević smuggled
the Chinese into Serbia and Republika Srpska (RS) during the war,in exchange for citizenship, their political allegiance
at election
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Figure 11. Typical storefront and goods sold in “Chinese Shops”.
time, and weapons and armaments. After the war, so informants tell us, these newcomers migrated from Serbia and RS
to Arizona. We sought to corroborate the Bosnian perspective through the media and through scholarly works. Our
most fruit- ful lead was mention of a memorandum of understanding between the government of the RS and a Chinese
firm (China Road and Bridge Corporation) to build a road in RS, beginning in 2011; perhaps the Chinese shops at
Arizona are related to legitimate commerce, and not, as many Bosnians suggested, smuggling (Kuzmanovic 2011). The
Chinese shop owners,according to informants, are considered to be quite culturally dissimilar from Bosnian culture.
For example, according to informants, the Chinese shop owners reportedly are known for driving expensive cars while
living in miserable conditions; they live many to a room, and they rent very rundown houses and they are often
perceived to be people who became wealthy through dubious deals during the war.
Implied in informant discussion of the presence of Chinese shops is the notion that these shops are suspected by locals
to be linked with political corruption, smuggling, war, and illegal trade. We do not suggest that the Chinese presence at
Arizona is nefarious. Yet we argue that the use of criminal–or at least poorly regulated–trade and its ties to politicians
as explanatory framework by the informants suggests that this structural connection between criminal smuggling,
money, and politicians, at the local and international levels, so prominent during the war, is understood by locals to
continue at the new Arizona. The Chinese shops, if we view them as “new” cultures in the marketplace, have not
displaced or challenged the political/ethnic/religious/identity dynamics of the new Arizona. Instead, they have offered
a new symbol of a new “other” against which community is articulated, in addition to the political elites who are
maintaining the new divisions of consociational governance. Their origin story continues the narrative that Arizona is
connected to the wartime economy, and that the people in power during that period are still influential at Arizona.
Security, safety, equity, order. Security, safety, equity and order– the assurance of a predictable and thus prosperous marketplace–were important to informants in the West hall. We had seen many cars marked “Police” and many men in police
clothes at Arizona that day (June 27, 2013); many of these men were drinking coffee at the multiple cafés at Arizona;
there were also people at the cafés who were not dressed as police. The casual socializing of police over coffee
suggested to us the ease of a regular visitor. In addition to the police and other forms of security, there is additional
evidence of a new Brčko, as seen in comparing new and old Arizona: metered parking spaces in a parking lot, with an
attendant, a time-stamp machine, and a payment machine with automated gate at the entrance and exit to the parking
lot.
These artifacts suggest there is a sense of predictability to the functioning of Arizona for visitors. Set working hours
(8:00am-4:00 pm) are another example of normalcy at Arizona. It is important to consider standard store hours, the
monitored parking lot, and the police presence, as a change from the first Arizona. In these market artifacts and
practices, we found evidence of Dayton’s goal of peacekeeping through re-building a state in Brčko, just as the
International Supervisor intended. We suggest that these symbols of stability are similar to the “homeostatic markers”
that Baker et al. (2015) suggest show a market, and a community, has transitioned from devastating event to normalcy.
Yet, fundamentally, according to our informants, the pre- vailing theme regarding police at Arizona is that they are
vital, but also part of a structure of corruption, even if police activities are not necessarily corrupt. Consider, for
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example, a scenario an informant described: police may issue financial penalties for various license-related
transgressions, real or manufactured. Informants contend that Mercator and Fis, multinational hypermarkets with stores
in Brčko area, influence the police; furthermore, they suggest that these hypermarkets do not like competition from
Arizona, and that the interests of the hypermarkets, the police activity at Arizona, and the issuing of fines, are all
connected via a political system. Standardization of the market’s structure (hours, metered parking) may represent the
institutionalization of a corrupt status quo that runs by emphasizing differences between groups, of insiders and seeming
outsiders, into the everyday life of people working and shopping at Arizona, and living in the broader Brčko area.
We suggest that these informants describe a system in which consumers and retailers are vulnerable to corruption, or
perceived corruption, in the marketing system. Unlike the ad hoc market in Baker et al. (2015), this market does not
emphasize equality and transparency, largely because of its seemingly continued relationship with market actors who
emerged during the war.
We are sensitive to describing allegations or intimations regarding corruption. In our individual field notes and in our
group discussion of our impressions regarding what was intriguing or disturbing during our participant observation and
our interviews, we explore potential counter arguments about the ways that informants explained emergent themes.
The second author was at Arizona during the pre-privatization, Wild West stage, and used that experience as a point of
triangulation that potentially adds nuance to the informant understanding of the police presence. Police presence at
Arizona could be interpreted as an indicator that the market is now under the administration of Brčko, and that Brčko
has a functioning government and civil society. However, the majority narrative that we heardsuggests that retailers and
consumers sense that they are operating in a marketing system in which they are vulnerable. Specif ically, the retailers
and consumers experience a state of vulnerability when they understand the people and institutions who control fairness
at Arizona to be governed by corruption and self-interest, as opposed to communal goals of regional eco- nomic growth
and transparent regulation. We believe that the example of consumers and retailers at Arizona extends the workof
macromarketing scholars (e.g., Baker 2009; Barrios et al. 2016; Shultz et al. 2005) on vulnerability, disasters and war
by describing how vulnerability emerges at the group level, and by describing how post-war markets, when little
attention is given to markets in the process of creating peace, can create vulnerabilities by institutionalizing power
imbalances.

The Future of Arizona
The curious case of underwear makes key points about the possible future of Arizona. That is, we were surprised to see
the quantity of cotton underwear sold throughout the small andlarge shops of the West hall. The quantity seems vastly
larger than anything that the local consumer-base could support through purchase and consumption. After touring the
market, we returned to one of the stores we had previously visited, whichsparked our curiosity about the quantity of
underwear sold at Arizona. We had seen many tables holding rows and rows of underwear and t-shirts, which were for
sale, in pre-packed 5-packs only, with a few samples hanging from the ceiling. The clothes offered in this store were
neatly presented and organized.Our goal was to follow-up on comments about wholesale trade atArizona. We approached
the person behind the counter and disclosed, in the local language, why we were there.
This person has worked at Arizona since the end of the war,and at this store for six years, and explained that the
atmosphere before the privatization of Arizona—when trade was illegal— was better than it is today. People visited for
fun; they had more money then, and nowhere else to buy goods than at Arizona. Now, fewer people come to Arizona,
and commerce is trending to wholesale. Many others talked with nostalgia about the old Arizona as a place where the
social relations of Yugoslavia could resume. We learned that the underwear typically is sold to people from
Herzegovina, who come to Arizona to buy wholesale and then re-sell the underwear in other parts of Herzegovina and
elsewhere. In a similar way, the change from local retail to wholesale distribution represents a new role for Arizona as
integrating the space further into the new regional marketing system, close to the border of the EU. We under- stood
from many informants that firms from Turkey are present at Arizona, using the area as a warehouse for distribution of
cotton garments that are made in Turkey.
Others confirmed that Arizona is moving to wholesale, largely because the local marketing system is changing, at
micro, meso and macro levels. Mercator and Fis–established retail brands known for quality products, wide
assortment, standardized pricing, superior retail service and clean retail spaces–now dominate the market for low-cost
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goods and food. Foreign investment in distribution tends to come from Turkey, while investment in retail and in rebuilding industry tends to come from Germany, Austria, and Croatia. The green market at Arizona is now 90%
wholesale. Much of the rest of Arizona is also moving towards wholesale commerce. The location of Arizona, with
inexpensive access to all countries of the former SFRY, adjacent and investing countries in the EU and Turkey, is a
motive for wholesale. One interpretation of the move to wholesale at Arizona is that, as standardization of retail arrives
in Brčko through multinational hypermarkets, the offering at Arizona is no longer competitive, except at the wholesale
level,regionally integrating and perhaps even globally integrating Arizona. Thus, we suggest that Arizona, and the
types of exchange witnessed there, are continuing to adapt, and address community needs, in this case, regional
integration as part of economic growth, long after the adversity of war. The adaptationat Arizona now, as during the era
of privatization, seems to be directed by the companies in charge of the wholesale operations,extending the views of
Baker et al. (2015), Shultz et al. (2005) and Barrios et al. (2016) that post-disaster / post-war market evolution is natural
and ongoing (see also Layton 2015).
What can Arizona as a site for distribution suggest about the political future of this divided society? Arizona is now
linked to neighboring nation-states, and those states have representative ethnic/political parties in Bosnia. Thus, we
argue, Arizona willcontinue to mirror social and political division, just as Arizona will likely function to integrate the
region globally. The contra- diction of Dayton is that it enforced peace based on territory and ethnicity, and in so doing,
enforced the ideologies around which the war was fought (cf. Jeffrey 2006). We suggest that the tension of the new
Arizona is that it is a shared space, in thatthe symbols of most of the participating, governing parties are present
(although we did see few if any Orthodox Christian crosses). Yet it is a shared space in which identity – political,
ethnic, religious and marketing and consumption – is defined through difference: symbols in stores, newcomers with
their symbols and meanings, the presence of police and order as representing a corrupt system; an acceptable, if not
fully shared, vision of the future; flexibility and adaptation; and perhaps most importantly, cooperation to ensure peace,
pros- perity and community, rather than fractious conflict, which could spiral to more violence, war and an inevitable
destruction of a reasonably well functioning marketing system.
Discussion
after a dramatic and ultimately violent disintegration of an extant political and marketing system; the numerous factors,
forces, relationships and trends–including political discord andwar. We examined how and why a new system can, and
indeed did, emerge at a post-conflict site following war, given the creation and enforcement of specific peace terms. In
exploring three particular phases—emergence, growth, and institutionalization—of Bosnia’s Arizona Market, we
highlight the role of the international community in creating a post-conflict market through its activity and inactivity
and the resolve of various stakeholders to rebuild or to take advantage of a safe, functional marketscape to provide
goods and services, and to build community.
The very first prosocial exchange at what is now the Arizona Market was a turn toward life and fundamental humanity.
Were it not, there would have been no second exchange, no third andno marketing system that we now see, today. The
emergence of Arizona thus supports the notion that we are “Homo Market- us,” the marketing animal (Shultz 2007); we
seek to engage inexchange, often repeatedly and via simple processes and com- plex institutions, to build community
and to enhance security and survivability. Due to the dominance of the elites in the market economy of the war, the
ethnicity and geography- based peace terms, and the weak role of the civilian and marketsectors as stated in the Dayton
Peace Accord, Arizona made legitimate the new criminal elites of the wartime marketing system by allowing them to
funnel their smuggled goods into Arizona, just as Arizona was a move away from conflict, towards peace.
Similarly to other macromarketing scholars (e.g., Bakeret al. 2015; Barrios et al. 2016; Layton 2015; Shultz et al.
2005), we reveal the importance of marketing exchange as a means of building community. Community emerged
through social interactions of exchange. Specifically to the case of Baker et al. (2015), buyers and sellers were
members of a community; findings from field research at Arizona Market, the relationship between community and
government institutions had/has both differences and ubiquities, an idea less well developed by other macromarketing
scholars. Arizona emergedfrom human-induced disaster and, fundamentally, (1) desire to end that which caused or is
still causing disaster, (2) interest to build community, (3) a framework and resources for rebirth, engagement,
institutionalization, and sustainability. At Ari- zona, the terms of the new institutional order, as largely promulgated by
the international community, while carving-out boundaries, did not account for institutional support for exchange or
provisioning resources. In short, there was no plan for a marketing system. This vacuum contributed to illegal activity
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that occurred during and continued after the war, often clandestinely but also through legitimate organizations, under
the watch of the international community. Money that was usedby consumers in exchange often came from donor
countries and from the diaspora as well as from the continuation of the wartime market. All this occurred in various
ways during war, under the cloud of war and its ongoing threat, and myriad complexities, rivalries and uncertainties
related thereto; some of which still exist. Further to the matter of resources, what becomes clear in the case of Arizona
is that markets not only “influence resource flows”, they are a resource; when administered well and safely, they
engender trust and create social order and meaning; in Bosnia, and presumably in most if not all complex societies,
they are indispensable to community.
Arizona moreover provided “solutions to unmet needs in times of adversity” (Baker et al. 2015, p. 337; see also Shultz
et al. 2005) and proved to be an adaptive marketing system in the process (Barrios et al. 2016; Layton 2015). At postconflict Arizona, the need was, at first, information and normal social relations, and, as the offering at the market was
established, for food and other goods. The resumption of normal social relations meant coffee with friends and
neighbors as well as the ad- hoc exchange. Our findings suggest that the social relations of exchange at Arizona provided
a return to some of the old socialrelations. They also supported a new political and economic elite, based on control of
and access to resources. The new elite seemed to reflect the power structures of the wartime economy, possibly casting
doubts on the likelihood of a lasting peace from the start, as well as contributing to the “Wild West” origin-narrative of
Arizona. Arizona reflects a dichotomy of creating community and institutionalizing political structures of difference
(consociationalism), with connection to the structures of the war economy. The outcome of the dichotomy has been to
create vulnerable consumers and retailers in a market that emerged after war.
Ongoing, new or deeper engagement with the EU, other states and blocs, and private investors continues to re-shape
the marketing system of Arizona, which thus far has proved to be adaptive and to provide an assortment of goods
and ser- vices, as well as a sense of community valued by many stake- holders. What also should become clear is that
the stakeholders comprising the marketing system—e.g., politicians, businesspersons, soldiers, consumers, and virtually
everyone in Europe weary of war—have choices and indeed make choices that can lead to three plausible outcomes: (1)
marketing system devastation; (2) hegemony, exclusion, and exploitation; or (3) macromarketing structures, processes
and practices that are inclusive and adaptive and offer an assortment of goods and services that enhance sustainable
peace and prosperity for as many stakeholders as is possible. Arizona emerged from the first outcome, was dominated
for a period by the second, and seems to be transitioning to the third. We are guardedly opti- mistic that a more
macromarketing orientation by the development community toward post-conflict marketing systems such as Arizona
Market, Brčko, and other post-conflict states that are characterized by consociationalism as a form of government,
such as Northern Ireland and Lebanon, may help build lasting peace and well-being.
Findings from this research may be useful to practices and policies in other post-conflict marketing systems that are or
are likely to be governed through consociational power sharing arrangements; they may also spur further research.
Events in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Central Africa Republic, Libya, Nigeria, South Sudan and other conflict and postconflict areas, sadly offer no shortage of opportunities for further study. Future research could and should assess the
role of the international community in the conflict and in the peace settlement, and the role of the market as a site of
shared space and shared society or a site for continuing the political dynamics of division that created and sustained
conflict. Other noteworthy forces are likely to emerge, as macromarketing scholars determine which factors are most
salient to stimulate and to sustain marketing systems conducive to peace and prosperity. Applications of multiple and
plausibly new methods will be useful, but what- ever the research tack and focus, a marketing systems perspective will
be imperative.
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Note
Bosnia and Herzegovina is a successor state of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which, from 1943 to
1992, was one of the six republics of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Locals use the terms Bosnia, or
simply BiH or BH. Locals also may refer to the northeastern part of the state as Bosnia, and the south- western part as
Herzegovina. Following the norms of our informants, we will use Bosnia to indicate both the geographic region Bosnia
and the state.
Bosnian citizens who are Muslim are known locally as Bosnians. The term Bosniak is favored by some when referring
to Muslim Bosnians, e.g., in US policy documents. Following our commit- ment to ethnographic methods, we use the
local term, Bosnian. Ethnic Croats who are citizens of Bosnia are known as Croats, and ethnic Serbs who are citizens
of Bosnia are referred to as Serbs.
ARBiH is the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, JNA is the Yugoslav National Army, HVO is the
Croatian Defense Council, and VRS is the Army of Republika Srpska.
While we are uncomfortable with the term “Chinese shop” and “Chinese presence,” as they imply reducing the
phenomenon of market and political globalization to ethnicity, these are the terms that locals use.
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